A REVIEW OF ROBERT ARDREY'S,

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Robert Ardrey's new book, The Social Contract (Collins, London, 1970 ) is a collection of animal stories loosely bound together by a common though not internally consistent ideology. This ideology is a curious one, but is also likely to be the most influential aspect of this book. Ardrey is read widely. In recent years a certain kind of popular anthropology has been virtually the only material of its sort to reach the general public; it is based on the proposition that man is less far removed from his animal relatives than has been commonly supposed. Ardrey is one major exponent of this point of view; Konrad Lorenz and Desmond Morris are others. Ardrey is explicitly supporting a a number of ideas based on the fundamental principle that man has a number of innate drives and organizers of behaviour and possibly faces evolutionary disaster if he cannot find ways to live in accord with this innate biological heritage. Ardrey finds that the increasing complexity of industrial, society is warping human behaviour in such a manner that fundamental human drives are contradicted or given little chance for expression. It is this attitude toward society which has led Ardrey to dedicate his book to Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Ardrey is in fundamental sympathy with Rousseau's arcadian utopianism although he cannot accept Rousseau's belief that there was a time before the social contract brought natural man into the restrictive orbit of unnatural society. Ardrey maintains that society is the natural condition of man and that the basic conditions for society are written into human genes. He therefore seeks to define the natural condition of man by reference to the natural conditions of society, and he does so mainly through an examination of the nature of non-human societies, especially those of the other primates. What he finds leads him to condemn characteristic features of modem society found in both 'capitalist' or 'socialist' countries. This book is written by an American and mainly for Americans, but its basic message is likely to have a far wider appeal; if only for this reason I think his book worth a detailed review. I should begin, as does Ardrey himself, with its ideological background. Its fundamental message is difficult to characterize since it is generally not a system of ideas consistently expressed or consistently adhered to. Its closest well-known relation appears to be the political thought of Thomas Jefferson. But at first it seems that this or its consequences is what Ardrey is most antagonistic to.
The first sentence of The Social Contract is deliberately provocative: "A society is a group of unequal beings organized to meet common needs" (3). By "unequal" Ardrey means genetically unequal. He is not necessarily against a Jeffersonian egalitarianism in so far as this is a social ethic rather than a statement of fact. What Ardrey is against is the supposed modern liberal view that all men are equal in potentiality and the view that this potentiality is usually blocked only by adverse external circumstances. He maintains that this idea is wrong, pernicious, and an affront to biological knowledge. Ardrey is in search of the innate background to human behaviour and therefore attacks those who support theories of environmental or social determinism; so, in his early pages, he attacks cultural anthropology, sociology, and behaviourist psychology in the persons of Sol Tax and Melville Herskovits, Durkheim, and B. F. Skinner respectively; on his own side he counts Noam Chomsky, several psychoanalysts, V. C. Wynne-Edwards, and, led by Lorenz, a number of ethologists. The only support he musters among anthropologists is from Claude Levi-Strauss who somewhere suggests that a desire for prestige is innately determined.
In his pursuit of the innate Ardrey decides in favour of the existence of: innate racial psychological differences (intelligence included; he does however find that blacks are fine athletes)
x ; a tendency to follow the leader once a true leader has emerged; a tendency to strive against obstacles; a real or symbolically transformed territoriality (i.e. selfdefinition through exterior symbols such as money and, of course, territory itself); and, in connection with this last, a natural xenophobia -fear and hatred of the stranger. Virtually all of these conclusions are based on observation of the societies of the higher animals and on analogous common-sense observations on man. I will devote little attention here to Ardrey's animal evidence though it takes up the majority of his book and though it is essential in giving his argument its surface plausibility. It is human society which is Ardrey's main concern, and it shall be mine as well. 1 "If racial distinction on the playing field is to be accepted, then can there exist theoretical grounds for banishing distinction in the classroom?" (63).
II
Ardrey's argument is analogical throughout, and though Ardrey says on occasion that one cannot reasonably argue from animals to man, he systematically ignores his own advice; a similarity noted between animal and human behaviour is generally taken as proof of the innate background for this behaviour in man. Ardrey only has infrequent and anecdotal reference to the nature of man in society.
He refers to a number of innate needs which he believes to exist in man and which he feels account for the nature of human society; but most of his examples are taken from animal behaviour studies. In man there is a ".... triad of innate needs, common.... to men and all higher animals. There is identity as opposed to anonymity; there is stimulation as opposed to boredom; there is security as opposed to anxiety" (168). Ardrey finds that men naturally seek identity through groups and their symbolic representations.
The drive for stimulation is the most clearly established of Ardrey's triad. Observation of infant behaviour and studies of the results of sensory deprivation clearly show what appears to be an innate demand for exterior stimulation. Ardrey relates this drive to the factor of 'aggression', a term which he takes over in its technical sense from psychoanalysis. This is its manifestation in action:
"We seek self-fulfillment. Within the limits and the directions of our individual genetic endowment? we seek such;"a state of satisfaction as willinform us as to why we were born. We have no true choice. The force that presses us is as large as all vital processes, and were it not so, life would return to the swamp. If there is hope for men, it is because we are animals. This is the aggressiveness that many would deny." (257) Though "self-fulfillment" is somewhat vague, what he seems to mean by it is 'meaningful identity with purposeful group activity'. Ardrey does not here take 'aggression' to signify a tendency toward physical violence. But in his first book, African Genesis, he traced man's descent from a carnivorous, weapon-using half-man and clearly indicated his feelings about our ancestry by his evocative reference to this/being (an australopithicine) as, "Cain". Ardrey's preference is generally weighted toward a belief in an inherent violent streak in man, and elsewhere in The Social Contract he states that: "What we have in our genetic endowment is the rejection of strangers and probably the propensity for violence. These have not been abolished" (277).
The last of his triad of drives -security -he also considers to be the least powerful. Men will seek identity and stimulation before security and will give up all else in their search; however, he does find that security is rather more important to women.
One of Ardrey's other main concerns, territoriality, is closely related to the factor of identity. The psychological substructure behind territoriality also produces identifications with other sorts of symbolic objects beyond territory, as Ardrey puts it, 'conventional objects conventionally competed for', e.g. property:".... a cultural institution, such as private property, which accords with natural law rarely fails" (210). Perhaps some will have a feeling of deja vu upon reading this.
The above drives are the main constituting forces of human social life. But the external environment also has its long-term demands, and these demands are what Ardrey takes to have been responsible for the evolutionary appearance of the basic drives in the first instance. A changing world demands changing capacities in the individuals which must deal with it. It was for this purpose that Ardrey believes that sex came into being and eventually, in social species, a range of instinctive behaviours to deal with the problems of sex. Sexual reproduction is a means for the rapid spread of potentially advantageous genes, genes which may be of value to species or local-group survival. The following statement indicates Ardrey's evaluation of the importance of the individual in this process and also his general ethical evaluation of the value of the individual per se:
"Variation: the variant individual who makes little sense in today's climate, but who may save us in tomorrow's; diverse isolates, spreading the risks of total population commitment, the recessive gene, hidden here, hidden there, waiting for new environments to perform the selective alchemy of transmuting dross into shining metals." (54) But he argues that selection must be of value to the group generally when social populations are involved. For example, individuals may come into possession of behaviour patterns detrimental to their personal survival but of advantage to the group as a whole. Thus male baboons will attack a leopard while the reproductively more valuable females make their escape.
Ill
There is an important and interesting issue here, one which has aroused considerable debate among ecologists and population biologists. Ardrey has accepted the basic theory of V. C. Wynne-Edwards who, in Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour (1962) , has put forward the idea of 'group-selection'. Wynne-Edwards believes that many patterns of social behaviour in animals have evolved as a means of holding group population density at an optimum level relative to its food supply; territoriality is found to be an important mechanism through which this is accomplished. Those groups which fail to distribute themselves wisely are at a selective disadvantage relative to other local groups of the same species which have proved more successful at doing this. Though Wynne-Edwards is somewhat equivocal about the way in which his basic theory is applicable to man, he evidentially believes that certain psychological traits of an innate character have arisen in man as a result of group-selection. He is saying that there is a selective pressure towards the adoption of those psychological mechanisms which can produce the social conventions which he believes to be responsible for the appearance and maintenance of territoriality in human society; one such mechanism appears in what WynneEdwards calls "a law-abiding conscience" (Wynne-Edwards, 1962:190) . Wynne-Edwards quotes Carr-Saunders (1922) with approval:
" "... men and groups of men [Wynne-Edward's italics] are naturally selected on account of their mental and physical characters. Those groups practising the most advantageous customs will have an advantage in the constant struggle between adjacent groups over those that practise less advantageous customs." " (Wynne-Edwards: 494) However, Wynne-Edwards (and Ardrey) obscures the fact that there may be group-selection on the basis of social organization alone, the most appropriate social organizations being selected rather than the most advantageous psychological traits of individuals; in this case it is only necessary to postulate the evolution of a general ability to assimilate what is known as 'culture' rather than any particularly specific psychological traits.
2 Wynne-Edwards is ultimately referring social organizations and certain customs back to fundamental and presumably innate psychological mechanisms that maintain them, and this is what interests Ardrey. There are very considerable problems here. Lack, for example, points out that:
"Wynne-Edwards discussed tribal behaviour in man, but man is so influenced by tradition that any parallel with the social behaviour of animals is highly dangerous." (Lack, 1966: 308) As I will show in a moment this criticism applies to Ardrey as well.
IV
There are various mechanisms which Ardrey believes to have been arrived at through group-selection; one of these is the capacity to form dominance hierarchies. Ardrey finds that, in social species, there will generally be rank ordering; an ordered group is a more viable entity than an anarchic group. This, says Ardrey, is an ordering which will generally be arrived at by competition; but it must be assured at the same time that competition does not harm the society at large; he believes, as does Wynne-Edwards, that many species get by this through competing 'for conventional objects by conventional means'; hence the war of all against all can be avoided. In some species these conventional objects and the conventional means of obtaining them are genetically encoded. For example, various devices may ensure that subordinate males accept their subordination; Ardrey notes that the subordinate males of some species may be subject to 'psychological castration' simply as a result of their subordinate status.
Ardrey sees society as a balance between necessary order and necessary disorder; disorder is necessary so that individuals with desirable traits may rise to the top, and order so that they do not destroy society in doing so. A proper balance between 'these two forces helps ensure the long-range genetic health of the population. But man does not always allow his societies to adopt the best form of social organization from a genetic standpoint: "Animal justice [i.e., full equality of opportunity] was perhaps the first natural law that civilized man began systematically to violate. Advantages of birth offer no guarantee of genetic superiority. Restrictions of caste, of class, of occupation, of poverty distort or suppress the phenotypic flowering of genetic endowment in the maturing individual. But the accident of the night [sex] , in all its rich, random resource, became in man socially aborted. There have been revolutions, it is true. But human history has far more frequently witnessed the decline of empires, the vanishment of kingdoms, the disappearance of peoples genetically exhausted through order's injustice." (Ardrey: 45) • Wynne-Edwards and Ardrey maintain that some social conventions work to the disadvantage of some individuals; some may be dealt out of the breeding population in the interests of the food-supply of the greater whole! The genetic issue is that of how it could possibly be that the traits which insure such a process could enter into the general population if their possessors are actually selected out. Lack believes that all the mechanisms posited by Wynne-Edwards as being due to group-selection can be explained in terms of 'normal' natural selection -Darwinian sexual selection, and the selection of traits on the basis of who leaves how many progeny.
Unfortunately Ardrey gives no evidence whatever for this last proposition. Apparently he is saying that the character of a population may alter for the worse (toward unadaptability) by an interference with gene flow within the population and a consequent less rapid distribution of valuable genetic traits. Since Ardrey does not indicate what groups he has in mind it is difficult to see exactly what he believes genetic stagnation to consist of. Only in small, highly intra-bred populations do any harmful genes become common enough to be an observable menace to general well-being. However, there are several means by which society could wittingly or unwittingly influence the direction of its evolution. Sexual selection is one example; an ideal of male or female beauty may influence who has how many offspring. This is a classical Darwinian mechanism used to explain the apparently nonviable absurdities of creatures such as the peacock.
If specific psychological characteristics are genetically influenced or determined then certain selective mechanisms could after a gene pool in a direction which could affect 'racial psychology'. Ardrey definitely believes that this can happen in human populations and that in fact it has happened and happened frequently. But he is never explicit about how it comes about in practice and never points to an actual population in which it is observably at work. The following statement, combined with his unverified assertions about genetic stagnation in unspecified populations, is his way of 'proving' his point: "The overwhelming environmental change which independence 1 [cultural isolation and consequent partial breeding isolation] has introduced provides overwhelming disproof for the acceptance of cultural relativism. Some populations, such as the Kikuyu in Kenya and the Ibo in Nigeria, have contained superb potentiality for change. They were fit for tomorrow... But some populations have so far demonstrated little or no such potentiality." (58) Now, it is possible though not particularly parsimonious to account for findings such as these by reference to genetic traits; but assertion is not proof. Note that his 'overwhelming disproof of cultural relativism' is neither overwhelming nor a disproof; it is assertion pure and very simple. Something which could, just possibly, be at least partially true is presented as though it were incontrovertibly true. His disproof of 'relativism' cannot be a disproof since here, as elsewhere, he does not give an example of a cultural explanation with which he could juxtapose his own explanations. To argue with something it is necessary to state clearly what one is arguing with.
It is well known that the Kikuyu and Ibo are exceptionally active in trade and politics; an explanation of these patterns of behaviour is available in some measure from sociology, cultural anthropology, and social psychology. Since Ardrey does not point to any trait save success which could have something to do with genes, and since even this is debatable on genetic grounds alone, it would appear that his case is entirely trivial. Unless he can show that the traits in question are somehow genetically determined; unless he can demonstrate from actual patterns of preferential marriage and natural or social selection that it is at least possible that the quality of social life can be due to genetic factors, then Ardrey's case is irrelevant. It is possible, at least in principle, to demonstrate that a given population may be biased toward selection of a certain trait; if sexual selection were at work, which in African societies it generally is not, then a certain trait could conceivably be selected for. If it is the case that men with a greater degree of some genetically determined psychological quality somehow leave more children or at least make it possible for others who carry this trait to leave more offspring (what is known as 'kin selection'), then again it is possible that a given trait may be selected for. Ardrey does not do any of this; his assertions are entirely empty, facile, and dangerous.
Ardrey believes that the Kikuyu and Ibo represent processes which may be going on in society everywhere; the contrary case, that there can be unfavourable selection and genetic stagnation, is a universalistic assertion as well. Is it also meant to apply to modern societies? Apparently so. He inveighs against social institutions which get in the way of gene flow; and this is certainly something which happens in industrialized societies. The following statement indicates Ardrey's opinion on the bad effects of such interference and, incidentally, also his view on what he takes to be one of the most evil side -effects of modern society -forced conformity:
"A population must achieve a fair degree of adaptation to its environment if it is to survive in the present. And if fitness for today were the sole criterion, then cultural relativism would be theoretically sound. But adaptation can be too perfect. When selection for conformity has persisted through a sufficient number of generations, all may seem well, yet reduction of variants will have affected the population's gene pool and reduced its prospects of survival tomorrow. Either variation so wild as to render future survival dubious, or conformity so narrow as to endanger the future, becomes the character of a genetically inferior population." (55) The idea of selection for conformity is a particularly inapt way to approach the existence of conformity in human society; conformity is surely something which is closely related to learning and to general culture. But evidently Ardrey greatly fears any tendency towards genetic conformity, and his discussion of Kikuyu and Ibo indicates that he believes that 'conformity' in relatively subtle psychological traits can be selected for genetically and, in fact, has been.
Thus, conformity is a bad thing; wild nonconformity is a bad thing. It is possible for a population to select for one alternative or the other; any genetically isolated population has the capacity to do so. Therefore Ardrey's implication is that this may happen within the various functional and cultural sub-groups of Western society, at least in so far as they form breeding isolates. How conformity as such might be selected for genetically is left obscure; and I have already illustrated the difficulties of applying such reasoning to specific societies. It is certain that Ardrey deplores the conformity which he believes that modern society attempts to force upon men; evidentially he also believes that there has not yet been a significant change in the more aggressive features of human nature; men, with their innate drives and triad of needs, are recalcitrant material, and beyond whatever artifices may be devised by the behaviourists and social relativists to bring them into line with the demands of modern society for 'conformity': "... we pray... in our industrial organizations, on our collective farms, in our churchly councils, in our processes of government, in our relations between states, in our righteous demands for world government, in our most seemly prayers that someday we shall all be the same. (...) As life is larger than man, so is life wiser than we are. As evolution has made us possible, so will evolution sit in final judgment. As natural selection declared us in, so natural selection, should our hubris overcome • us, will declare us out." (367) V The Ibo and Kikuyu example is not the only one that Ardrey uses to justify his claims about psychological differences between populations. One of his prime examples is derived from statistical surveys of I.Q. test results made in the United States; here Ardrey is on slightly firmer ground if only for the reason that much work has in fact been done in this area. The basic claim to be made here is the inverse of that which we have seen about the Kikuyu, Ibo and others. If it can be shown that all social factors can be eliminated in an explanation of differing racial psychological traits, then there might be reasonable grounds for saying that such traits are genetically based. This Ardrey attempts to do in his discussion of the I.Q. controversy. I am scarely a specialist in I.Q. testing, but it is the case that this is an intensely debatable area of discussion both for political and for methodological reasons. I do not intend to review the entire nature-nurture controversy; I will simply point out what Ardrey has done with the data as it stands. He has declared that intelligence is related to racial heredity ; blacks are statistically inferior to whites in their ability to manipulate the kinds of facts and processes tested by I.Q. tests, and he believes this difference to be genetically based. Of course it is true that the statistical evidence does exist; it is its meaning which is in question. Most sociological and psychological statistics suffer from a fundamental problem which makes them very difficult to interpret; whatever uniformities appear in them tend to be overdetermined, caused by several factors rather than just one. The controversy over I.Q. testing is greatly complicated by this kind of problem; class differences must be evened out, cultural differences taken into account, motivational aspects of the testing process itself analyzed, and so on. I cannot settle this argument; it still goes on in the journals and elsewhere. But I will say that Ardrey has pretty well ignored these complexities and for this reason his conclusion lacks force. 4 I.Q. tests rate culture-bound abilities with which not all persons even in the same general culture are equally familiar. Until it is certain that statistical differences in I.Q. results are not due to differences (for example) in child rearing and to differences in general cultural background, then genetic arguments seem a waste of time. I might say that child-rearing in particular has a profound effect on the 'intelligence' of children; this effect can be dramatic, as witness the by now numerous studies made on children deprived of maternal care in early childhood. I am not trying to make a radical claim for social 'determinism'; I am simply stating that in proven fact culture does influence the potentiality and the content of learning to a very great degree and, most likely, usually to a greater absolute degree than most genetic differences between individuals.
VI
The fact that Ardrey does not in general cite any clear evidence for his case will not be noted by the public which is most likely to read his book; and I suspect that some parts of The Social Contract will be See Bodmer and Cavalli-Sforza (1970) for a discussion of these complexities. seized upon for reasons which are not exactly motivated by scientific objectivity. Much of all three of Ardrey's books give a kind of covert support to certain ideological biases; Ardrey knows full well that he is open to the charge of racism but disclaims responsibility by invoking pure scientific curiosity and by accusing the liberal spokesmen of prejudice in the other direction. No direct charge of racism can be levelled against Ardrey himself; his general ideology, which I will discuss in a moment, does not permit it. But I have shown that his attitude toward evidence is scarcely responsible, and it is this evidence which leads him to make the dogmatic assertions which I sum up below: 1) Groups which have been genetically isolated are likely to differ genetically from the groups from which they have been isolated. An intra-breeding class or caste may differ from the surrounding society, and the results of this inbreeding may turn up in psychological traits, conceivably of a rather subtle nature. Thus cultural features of enclave groups such as the Chinese away from China, the British working-class, the blacks, the Jews, university professors and royalty may possibly be genetically determined in some measure. Ardrey's assertions can and most probably will be used to justify a number of beliefs expressible in the form: 'The X are all the same; they'll never change.' Ardrey's assertions can also give the naive fuel for the belief that the populations should be kept separate lest the one contaminate the other. Ardrey does not support such beliefs himself.
2) Women are genetically less aggressive than are men. Women are naturally inclined to take the subordinate position. This is a hot matter also. Ardrey's conclusions would have been quite acceptable to the Kinder-Kiiche-Kirche beliefs of National-Socialism.
3) Mankind is naturally 'aggressive' and probably violent. Hence one could reason that repressive policing may always be in order. Ardrey does not comment on the need for police, save to say that increased social violence may lead to a surfeit of them. A natural "propensity for violence" is a dubious idea; the existence of 'aggression' in its technical sense may not be in question; nonetheless the choice of the word 'aggression' for the innate factor driving much of human activity in the world is distinctly inappropriate and misleading. 5 4) Men naturally cleave to certain external objects in accord with the "natural law" of territoriality. 'Property' is one form that this takes. This idea may have something in it though not for the reason and with 5 The concept of 'aggression' is one which deserves an analytical examination in its own right.
the implications that Ardrey thinks; I will discuss this briefly at the conclusion. It is very unlikely that this proposition will cause any great unease on Wall Street or in the Monday Club. Enough said. It is my conclusion that Ardrey's 'evidence' seldom gives any definitive support to any but a pre-judged and intuitive acceptance of these propositions. I cannot think, given the state of things generally, that these conclusions are harmless. They are grossly irresponsible in a book destined for the large public to which Ardrey appeals. His suggestions are presented as scientifically 'proved' affirmations whereas what Ardrey has really done is to provide a catechism for natural-law conservatism; but it is a paradox in Ardrey that he puts forward what actually turns out to be a kind of absolute egalitarianism while at the same time many of his specific conclusions could have profoundly non-egalitarian implications. It may at least be said that Ardrey does not support these implications himself, nor does he suggest any action which should be taken on the basis of his findings. At most he says that some things, e.g. the subordination of women and man's desire for property, are so deeply rooted that they can probably never be completely expunged. And, on the whole, his more positive statements actually support a certain kind of conservative ideology so extreme as to be revolutionary, an ideology not realized in this or perhaps any other century, save possibly in the minds of 19th Century 'radical' political economists. To this I now turn:
VII
All of what follows is based on the idea that man's genetic heritage comes into conflict with forms of social organization that do not permit an expression of basic drives. We have seen already that Ardrey is sceptical of any social organization which gets in the way of gene flow; whatever else Ardrey cannot be considered a racial separatist. In the latter part of his book Ardrey is more concerned with the interaction of man's biological heritage with modern forms of social life; in general he sees great and increasing potential for social violence. Such violence, formerly expressed in war, is seen as a redirection of energies now denied that outlet by nuclear detente. The young are chiefly implicated in this. Thus Ardrey manages to include within his scheme virtually all disturbing phenomena of our time; this no doubt is a considerable selling point in itself. It is this aspect of Ardrey's book which will be the most suggestive for anyone interested in practical concerns.
As I have said, the basic point of this part of the book is that modern society is providing increasingly little opportunity for the exercise of man's biological drives. This is Ardrey's ultimate explanation for youthful revolt. If every being requires 'self-fulfillment' and an outlet for its charge of aggressive energy, and if it comes to be the case that a society does not provide for this, then there is trouble. Ardrey points to certain sociological findings which, for him, illustrate this malaise. He examines studies on industrial psychology and discovers that men work best and most purposefully when they are implicated directly in the planning of their labour. Men under such conditions are not, according to Ardrey, working in accord with a stimulus-response-reinforcement model in which money is the positive reinforcement and its lack the negative: "... capitalist and Marxist share the same idee fixe of the almighty dollar; that man works exclusively for reasons of economic determinism. The Hawthorne workers [the workers of the electric components plant where the pioneering industrial study was done] had been motivated by identity, not money -by being people different." (159) Stated somewhat differently, Ardrey seems to believe that men work best and most happily when they are implicated in the results of their labour, a belief which is not dissimilar to Marx's own view on this matter.
Ardrey also examines studies conducted by urban sociologists on city neighbourhoods. He discovers that, given a chance, neighbourhoods are self-establishing, self-regulating, and exclusive relative to other neighbourhoods. Again, men are directly implicated in rewarding human activity; but also they close out others through their innate territoriality. The antithesis to this situation may be seen in the anomic tower-block housing estate. In general some of these aspects of Ardrey's thought bear a startling resemblance to classical Marxism.
Of course it is true that Ardrey relates all the phenomena above to his three innate needs; but they are so vague as to be meaningless in this context. Nonetheless he has hit on things which are socially interesting. Given the fact that Ardrey is pointing to the above studies as illustrative of the nature of man, and given that he is against restrictive social organization, Ardrey's ideas come close to Marxism and also to a certain kind of conservatism; he fits uncomfortably between the two positions but finally opts for the latter.
Ardrey would look with approval at a society maintaining maximum flexibility within the confines of biological imperatives. The Russians prevent some forms of hereditary privilege by making hereditary wealth impossible; this presumably keeps everyone up to the competitive mark as well. I wonder if Ardrey approves of 'this measure, given that private property is in accord with natural law. It is certain that he does not approve of bureaucracy; in this he is in agreement with the radical critiques coming both from East and West. He sees the bureaucratic state as a prime cause of the social malaise:
"Human youth recognizes that a few achieve identity. But it is a shrinking few, as organizations devour each other, while youth grows in numbers. And so there are those among the young -today some, tomorrow morewho suggest that if something does not give, then they will tear the place down as a house not worth living in. There is nothing unusual, in the quest for identity, to find those who will contemptuously reject security's last offer." (173) He finds this quite right and proper from a biological perspective. But elsewhere he advocates restraint. The division of labour, he says, makes modern society very delicate, and youth should consider this before making irrational attacks. Again a paradox appears; Ardrey is unwilling to go along with his own argument, and so stops short of advocating anything really in accord with what he often states are the conditions for human satisfaction. His belief that society must strike a balance between order and disorder leads to the following deeply felt but puerile and thoroughly shallow proposition:
"What is at stake in our times is not the survival of man, but the survival of man's most rewarding of ail inventions, democracy." (287)
Ardrey cannot or does not deal with the fact that a democratic form is something of. a farce in a society which he himself characterizes, as made up of ever more embracing bureaucratic organizations. But its defence is all that he can positively suggest, and as a part of its defence a return to nothing other than 'individual responsibility'; otherwise there will be no alternative to the police state:
"As a people normally gets the government it deserves, so a society normally receives the punishments it asks for. And so long as we support the Age of the Alibi [social determinism being one such alibi], just so long must we inhabit the Age of Anxiety. There must come a limit, of course, when the social order to endure accepts violent means to suppress violent disorder. And we shall then see an endless procession of concentration camps, death penalties, public whippings, and police ascendancy. It is the likelier outcome, no doubt." (340) The American mind can be very tortuous indeed when it comes to political reasoning. Ardrey has blocked every possible solution to.the problems which he poses. He suggests the desirability of self-deter-mination, of worker's control, community organization, decentralization, and at the end of it all can only return to what can only be built upon these bases and which cannot really precede their establishment -T democracy and responsibility.
VIII
A curious route to have followed. Ardrey's formulations are something in which many would like to believe. Ardrey's dream comes from a time at least as far back as Jefferson; it is a dream of a pristine society built upon a base of autonomous, self-determining, free small farmers and merchants. This is still very much a live ideal in North America among so-called 'conservatives' and so-called 'radicals' alike, and every now and then it takes a political or quasi-political form. It has been noted in the rise of the Populist movement at the end of the last century and it can still be detected at work behind such phenomena as George Wallace. There are also still many who believe that what is needed is a return to a pure capitalism in which enterprise is neither fettered by monopoly nor by government interference. The followers of the American novelist cum philosopher Ayn Rand believe just this in spite of its apparent absurdity. The fact that the beliefs which persons of this persuasion actually express are often inconsistent and even brutal in implication gives no very good reason to discount it all as either unimportant or stupid. But, yet again, such ideas may be 1 seen to have a quite definite social context. Still, how interesting to find this stance supported once more by an argument based upon biological imperatives and natural law. Perhaps such views have their greatest day in a time of social turmoil; it is perhaps comforting to find a stable point of reference if only in unproven, evocative statements about the basic ground of human nature. And of course an argument such as Ardrey's is almost designed to appeal to an established, fundamentally conservative class such as the American bourgeoisie, one which gets much of its knowledge of the world through book-club selections.
Though it is not very convincing in general, the biological argument may have some use in application to certain cases. For example, little enough is known about the make-up of the human mind; Ardrey mentions Chomsky at one point in his discussion of innate factors in human mentality. Chomsky points to the existence of innate factors which make it possible for the infant to assimilate the complex grammatical structures of language. Along this same line it might also be suggested that human cognitive organization has its own demands and that these demands could lead to, among other things, what Ardrey characterizes as innate territoriality, xenophobia, identity through symbols, etc. This is not to say that territoriality, xenophobia, and so forth are themselves innate, but that they may be aspects of a far greater problem concerning the general structure of the mind.
In general Ardrey is so devoted to biological arguments and analogical arguments from the observation of human and animal behaviour that he pays no attention at all to much material which, for good or ill, could bear on his case. The result is that he became so thoroughly muddled that there was no possibility that he might have given some kind of sense to the analysis of the bio-social nature of society.
I can only conclude this review by stating that I believe that Ardrey has written a harmful book. It will probably have most appeal to those who are already de facto committed to an essentially absurd bureaucratic 'democracy' or worse. Ardrey may simply be preaching to the committed; still his arguments must be counted as harmful in that they serve as a re introduction of pseudo-biological issues which are quite irrelevant and retrograde relative to the real social dilemmas with which we have to deal. How very odd. Surely this cannot have been what Ardrey set out to do. MICHAEL G. KENNY
